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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
It should also be noted that the defendant had actually
received the mailed summons and thereby had notice of the
prospective litigation. Therefore, the defendant could not defend
on the basis of lack of notice. Moreover, it is apparent that the
defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that the
Buffalo residence was no longer his "usual place of abode" within
the meaning of the statute. Procedurally, Rich has as its salient
feature the fact that the party alleging a change of domicile
will be required to make a substantial showing of a severance
of his ties with New York in addition to the acquisition of
out-of-state facilities.
CPLR 308(4).: Service by publication authorized in
negligence action.
In Deredito v. Winn,'6 the nonresident defendant was involved
in an automobile accident in New York. Since the defendant's
address was unknown to plaintiff, personal jurisdiction was pre-
dicated upon service by publication alone. The appellate division,
second department, unanimously held that:
article 3 of the CPLR does not authorize service by publication
upon . . . nondomiciliary defendants . . . where: (a) no prior attach-
ment of their property in this state has occurred and (b) a finding
could not properly be made that service by publication would give
notice to them of the action and an opportunity to defend themselves.1 7
Subsequent to Deredito, the appellate division, second depart-
ment, handed down the companion decisions of Sellars v. Raye 18
and Dobkin v. Chapman.19 Dobkin. held that due process was
satisfied by service effected by the mailing of the summons to
an address given by the defendant at the scene of an automobile
accident, despite the fact that the defendant no longer resided
there. The Sellars court, under factually similar circumstances,
held that service upon the Secretary of State, plus registered
mail sent to the address supplied by the defendant at the accident,
as well as publication in the vicinity of that address was sufficient.
Dissenting opinions in both Sellars and Dobkin reasoned that there
was no distinction between the facts of Deredito and those of
Sellars and Dobkin, and, therefore, Deredito was controlling.
A recent supreme court decision in the second department,
Gibbs v. BaldZwin,20 has held that service by publication was
1623 App. Div. 2d 849, 259 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1965).
11 Id. at 849-50, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
18 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 269 N.Y.S.2d 7 (2d Dep't 1966).
1925 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1966).
20 52 Misc. 2d 268, 275 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966).
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sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
motorist after all other attempts at service had failed. Although
Gibbs relied on Sellars as authority for its holding, it did not
mention Deredito at all. Possibly the Gibbs court considered
that the Sellars and Dobkin decisions had eroded Deredito to the
point that it was no longer controlling. However, Sellars and
Dobkin were concerned with non-personal service by means other
than by publication alone, whereas Gibbs and Deredito involved
service by mere publication. This fact would appear to be a
sufficient distinction to warrant the conclusion that the Gibbs
court should have been bound by Deredito.
Assuming, however, that Gibbs is in accord with Dobkin
and Sellars, and is not controlled by Deredito, a further problem
arises: the conflict between the first and second departments con-
cerning the constitutionality of substituted service directed at an
address at which the plaintiff knows the defendant does not reside.
The appellate division, second department, has upheld such service
in Dobkin and Sellars. However, the appellate division, first
department, is not in accord. Under the first department's decision
in Polansky v. Paugh,21 where it appears that the defendant no
longer resides at the only address known to the plaintiff, sub-
stituted service directed at that address does not comply with
the constitutional requirement of due process. 22 A fortiori, it would
seem that under the Polansky rationale, service by publication
under similar facts would be equally unconstitutional. Yet, Gibbs
has permitted service by publication under CPLR 308(4), and
thereby has accentuated the conflict between the departments as
to the dictates of due process.
While the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
publication is the least likely method to provide actual notice
of the pendency of litigation, it has not entirely precluded its
use in certain cases where the defendant's whereabouts was
unknown. 23  The essential requirement of service as enunciated
by the Court is that the method must be "reasonably calculated"
to apprise the defendant of the action against his interest and
give him a reasonable opportunity to defend.24  Consequently,
in regard to in rem actions, it has generally been held that
service by publication alone will satisfy the requirements of due
process 25 since the owner of the res is deemed to have knowledge
2123 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1st Dep't 1965).
22 Despite the fact that the cases were decided under different sections of
CPLR 30S, the same due process requirements are applicable to each.
23 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
There it was held that service by publication upon certain unknown bene-
ficiaries of a trust was constitutional since there was no other recourse.
24 Ibid.
25 CPLR 315.
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of the status of his possessions. However, in an in personam
action, no such additional factor being present, service by publica-
tion cannot be expected to reach the defendant. It would, there-
fore, seem likely that the Supreme Court would not react favorably
to a case where in personam jurisdiction is to be founded upon
notice by publication alone.
It may be possible, however, to justify service by publication
in actions arising from automobile accidents. In light of decisions
permitting service by publication alone in in rem actions, it may
well be asserted that where a party has been involved in an auto-
mobile accident requiring the exchange of license information,
such as in, Gibbs, Polansky, Sellars and Dobkin, he shall be
presumed to have constructive notice of the possibility of somejudicial action in the near future. The onus, therefore, should be
upon him to permit the other party to maintain contact with him.
This result may be accomplished by requiring him to provide
a forwarding address upon moving from the address given at the
scene of the accident. When he has failed to do so, service
could then be effected by publication.
In a case where a plaintiff obtains a default judgment on a
cause of action arising from an automobile accident due to the
defendant's lack of actual notice, the defendant's rights are pro-
tected by CPLR 317 which permits him to open the default and
defend on the merits. However burdensome this procedure may be
to a defendant, it would appear that a greater injustice arises
when a plaintiff is precluded from all legal recourse due to the
defendant's moving to an unknown address thereby making
personal or constructive service upon him impossible.
ARTICLE 10- PARTIES GENERALLY
CPLR 1007: Legal expenses not allowed.
Frank Angelilli Constr. Co. v. Sullivan & Son, Inc.26 involved
an action by a customer against its supplier for breach of warranty
of merchantability in which the supplier impleaded the manu-
facturer under CPLR 1007. As part of the indemnification, the
supplier sought legal expenses.
Generally, in the absence of statutory or contractual liability,
legal expenses in litigating a cause of action are not recoverable.27
However, there is some New York precedent allowing their
2652 Misc. 2d 306, 276 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1966).
27 Edelman v. Goodman, 47 Misc. 2d 8, 261 NY.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1965).
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